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Abstract
This paper presents a two-country model linking Poland and the euro area and applies it for assessment
of heterogeneity across these two regions. Overall, our results can be seen as rather inconclusive about
the di⁄erences in parameters describing agents￿decision-making in Poland and in the euro area. On the
contrary, we ￿nd strong evidence for heterogeneity in terms of volatility and synchronization of shocks
hitting both economies. Our results may be viewed as a step towards estimating the costs of Poland￿ s
entry to the European Monetary Union, associated with giving up the monetary autonomy and losing
bene￿ts from stabilizing movements of the exchange rate.
1 Introduction
This paper presents an estimated two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for
Poland and the euro area and applies it for assessing the degree of heterogeneity between these two re-
gions. In particular, relative relevance of two sources of heterogeneity are examined: di⁄erences in structural
parameters and asymmetry of shocks hitting the two economies.
While comparing a set of structural and stochastic characteristics of the Polish economy with those
prevailing in the euro area seems to be an interesting task in itself, our research is additionally motivated by
Poland￿ s prospective entry to the European Monetary Union (EMU). A standard and well-known implication
of the optimal currency area (OCA) theory is that asymmetric temporary shocks and asymmetric short-run
response to common shocks weaken the case for a common currency, as being a member of a monetary
union implies losing bene￿ts form the monetary autonomy and stabilizing movements of the exchange rate.1
Consequently, identifying the main sources of heterogeneity between Poland and the euro area may be viewed
as an important step towards assessing the costs of Poland￿ s EMU-entry.
The structure of our model builds largely on the previous work in the new open economy macroeconomics
(NOEM) literature, launched by the in￿ uential contribution by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995).2 The choice of a
particular setup of the workhorse model is always a task involving a great deal of subjectivity. Building a large
and comprehensive model, with a large number of stochastic disturbances and rich propagation mechanisms,
is a time-consuming task. Moreover, taking big and sophisticated models to the data is usually far from
straightforward, if not impossible, given data availability.3 Needless to say, these kinds of constraints to
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1The classical reference is Mundell (1961), see also Tower and Willett (1976) for a summary of subsequent contributions. A
modern reconsideration of the OCA theory can be found in Corsetti (2008).
2See also Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000). An extensive survey of the NOEM literature is provided by Lane (2001).
3Bergin (2003) was one of the ￿rst to estimate a NOEM model. Later contributions, with more complicated structure include
de Walque and Wouters (2004) or Adolfson et al. (2005), both of which can be considered as open economy versions of the
in￿uential Smets and Wouters (2003) setup. Relatively large multi-country DSGE models are maintained at the IMF, the two
most popular of which are Global Economic Model (Laxton and Pesenti, 2003) and Global Fiscal Model (Botman et al., 2006),
see Botman et al. (2007) for an overview. However, these models are calibrated rather than estimated.
1empirical investigations are particularly severe for countries like Poland. The most relevant obstacles are
short time series and scarcity of well-established stylized facts.
Taking into account these considerations, our strategy is to keep the size of the model relatively small,
so that it is possible to estimate most of its important and not-easy-to-pin-down parameters, instead of
resorting to calibrations. The small size has an additional advantage of increased clarity and operationality.
The obvious limitation is a risk of neglecting potentially important mechanisms, relevant for the problem
considered.
Given the main focus of the paper and our future research objectives, including examination of macro-
economic stabilization and shock propagation in alternative monetary and exchange rate regimes, we want
to emphasize the following choices underlying our theoretical and empirical strategy. First, while keeping the
main structure of our model relatively simple, we are less reductionist in those model components that are
known to be of particular relevance for an appropriate description of the nominal side of the economy. This
motivates the following choices: a two-sector setup allowing for ￿ home bias￿in preferences, explicit modelling
of distribution services for consumption goods and separating price-related nominal rigidities from those aris-
ing from the labour market.4 Second, we favour a structure enabling us to switch the model between ￿ exible
and ￿xed exchange rate regimes without the need to pin down any additional parameters. The complete asset
market assumption is particularly useful in this respect. Third, as we want to focus on cyclical comovements
between macrovariables in the two regions, we abstract from long-term trends in the data. This justi￿es
several transformations of the observable variables, which we discuss in more detail in section 3.5
Our two-country model is driven by fourteen stochastic disturbances, seven for each economy. Innovations
to the shocks are allowed to be correlated across countries. We estimate our model using Bayesian methods,
which allow one to formalize the use of a priori beliefs in the estimation process. The merits of the Bayesian
approach in ￿tting DSGE models are well-known.6 Two of these stand out as particularly important for our
study. First, given short time series available, incorporating additional information is necessary to mitigate
identi￿cation problems, which make the unconstrained maximum likelihood method unreliable or at least
impractical. At the same time, the Bayesian approach allows one to avoid the other extreme strategy, i.e.
pure calibration, the implementation of which is inhibited by lack of appropriate micro-evidence for Poland,
helping one to pin down some of the structural parameters. Second, Bayesian estimation naturally leads to
the comparison of models based on their ￿t to the data. This provides a useful platform for formal testing of
various sources of heterogeneity across Poland and the euro area by comparing and validating unrestricted
and several restricted versions of our model.
This paper is not the ￿rst one examining heterogeneity between economies in a multi-country DSGE setup.
However, the previous studies usually focused on asymmetries between relatively closely related economies,
using models which were probably too stylized to employ them for assessing the degree of asymmetry between
a transition country like Poland and a highly integrated and developed club like the euro area. For instance,
Jondeau and Sahuc (2005) examine heterogeneity between the three largest euro area economies using a
stylized DSGE model, which abstracts from capital accumulation and wage rigidities. In a much richer
setup, Pytlarczyk (2005) analyzes Germany within the euro area, but, similarly to Jondeau and Sahuc (2005),
assumes that all goods are tradable. A separate treatment of tradable and nontradable goods is provided by
Rabanal (2007), who focuses on Spain￿ s links with the euro area. However, his model assumes the production
function to be linear in labour and fully ￿ exible wages. None of the above mentioned contributions includes
the distributions sector for consumption goods.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, while some of the structural parameters (i.e.
those describing microfounded decision mechanisms of the agents) in Poland and in the euro area seem to
be somewhat di⁄erent, relatively low precision of the estimates does not allow to draw any ￿rm conclusions
4The importance of including non-traded goods in NOEM models was emphasised e.g. by Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000). The
implications of home bias in goods preferences for exchange rate dynamics are demonstrated in Warnock (1998) and Benigno
and Thoenissen (2003). The introduction of the distribution sector in NOEM models is largely due to Erceg and Levin (1996).
Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005) argue that models with both staggered price nad wage setting dominate models with only
one type of rigidity.
5While abstracting from long-run interrelations between macrovariables might generally be seen as a clear disadvantage,
it has an important merit while working with data for a transition economy. As demonstrated by Rabanal (2007), imposing
dogmatic long-run restrictions in a stylized model estimated for a country undergoing structural shifts may sizably worsen its
￿t to the data, including the ability to replicate the key second moments.
6A comprehensive overview of Bayesian methods used for estimation of DSGE models is provided by An and Schorfheide
(2007). See also Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2004) or Lubik and Schorfheide (2006).
2in this respect. As regards the monetary policy feedback rules, interest rate smoothing seems to be more
important in the euro area than in Poland, however, the model allowing for di⁄erent parametrization of the
Taylor rules across countries does not clearly outperform the one assuming homogeneity. While we do not
￿nd any strong evidence for heterogeneity in terms of inertia of the stochastic disturbances, their volatility is
signi￿cantly higher in Poland. Finally, our results suggest that structural shocks are rather weakly correlated
across Poland and the euro area.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of our two country model.
Section 3 discusses data issues. The empirical strategy and estimation results are presented in section 4.
Section 5 evaluates the dynamic properties of the model. Formal tests of heterogeneity between Poland and
the euro area are performed and discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Structure of the model
There are two countries in the world: Home (H) and Foreign (F). Each country is inhabited by a continuum
of in￿nite-lived consumers, distributed over the intervals of [0;n] and [n;1], respectively. Both countries
produce a continuum of di⁄erentiated tradable goods, indexed on the interval [0;n] in the Home economy
and [n;1] in the Foreign economy. Each country produces also an array of nontradable goods, distributed
over the same intervals as tradable goods. Since the general setup of the Foreign country is similar to that for
the Home economy, in what follows we focus on the exposition for the latter. To the extent needed, variables
and parameters referring to foreign agents are marked with an asterisk.
2.1 Households
Households in a given country are assumed to be homogenous, i.e. they have the same preferences and
endowments. Households provide labour services and rent capital to domestic ￿rms. Each household has
access to complete markets for state-contingent claims, which implies that any idiosyncratic shocks among
the households do not result in heterogeneity of their behaviour. Hence, we can focus on the optimization
problem of a representative household for a given country.
A typical household j in the Home country maximizes the following lifetime utility function:
Ut(j) = Et
1 X
k=0
￿
k
￿
"d;t+k
1 ￿ ￿
(Ct+k(j) ￿ hCt￿1)1￿￿ ￿
"l;t+k
1 + ’
Lt+k(j)1+’
￿
(1)
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t, ￿ is the discount
rate, ￿ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, h is the external habit persistence
parameter, ’ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. The instantaneous utility is thus a
function of a consumption bundle Ct, to be de￿ned below, and labour e⁄ort Lt.
The maximization of (1) is subject to a sequence of intertemporal budget constraints of the form:
PC;tCt(j) + PI;tIt(j) + Etf￿t;t+1Bt+1(j)g (2)
= Bt(j) + Wt(j)Lt(j) + RK
t Kt (j) + ￿H;t(j) + ￿N;t(j) + Tt(j)
where PC;t denotes the price of the consumption bundle Ct, PI;t is the price of investment goods It, Bt+1
is the nominal payo⁄ in period t+1 of the portfolio held at the end of period t, Wt is the nominal wage, RK
t
denotes household￿ s income from renting capital Kt, ￿H;t(j) and ￿N;t(j) are dividends from tradable and
nontradable goods producers, respectively, while Tt stands for lump sum government transfers net of lump
sum taxes. ￿t;t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payo⁄s, such that Et￿t;t+1 = R
￿1
t , where Rt
is the gross return on a riskless one-period bond. There are two shocks to instantaneous utility, common to
all households in the home country: consumption preference shock "d;t and labour supply shock "l;t.
2.1.1 Consumption choice
The ￿rst order conditions to the representative consumer￿ s maximization problem imply the following con-
ventional stochastic Euler equation:
3￿RtEt
(
"d;t+1
"d;t
￿
Ct+1 ￿ hCt
Ct ￿ hCt￿1
￿￿￿ PC;t
PC;t+1
)
= 1 (3)
The consumption bundle Ct consists of ￿nal tradable goods CT;t and nontradable goods CN;t, aggregated
according to:
Ct =
C
￿c
T;tC
1￿￿c
N;t
￿
￿c
c (1 ￿ ￿c)1￿￿c
(4)
where ￿c denotes the share of tradable goods in the total consumption of home households.
Following Burstein et al. (2003),7 we assume that consuming a ￿nal tradable good requires ! units of
nontradable distribution services YD:
CT;t = minfCR;t;!￿1YDg (5)
The index of raw tradable goods is de￿ned by:
CR;t =
C￿
H;tC
1￿￿
F;t
￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿ (6)
where CH;t is the bundle of home-made raw tradable goods consumed at home, CF;t is the bundle of
foreign-made raw tradable goods consumed at home and ￿ denotes the share of home goods in the home
basket of tradable goods.
The indices of nontradable and both types of tradable goods are in turn given by the following aggregators
of individual varieties:
CN;t =
"￿
1
n
￿ 1
￿ Z n
0
Ct(zN)
￿￿1
￿ dzN
# ￿
￿￿1
(7)
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1
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￿￿1
(8)
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1
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￿ Z 1
n
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￿ dzF
# ￿
￿￿1
(9)
where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of a given type.
The sequence of intratemporal optimization problems implies the following demand functions for each
variety of goods:
Ct(zN) =
1
n
(1 ￿ ￿c)
￿
pt (zN)
PN;t
￿￿￿ ￿
PN;t
PC;t
￿￿1
Ct (10)
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￿
pt (zH)
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1
1 ￿ n
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￿
pt (zF)
PF;t
￿￿￿ ￿
PF;t
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where pt(zj) is the price of variety zj, while the composite price indexes are de￿ned as follows:
PN;t =
￿
1
n
Z n
0
Pt(zN)1￿￿dzN
￿ 1
1￿￿
(13)
7See also Corsetti and Dedola (2005).
4PH;t =
￿
1
n
Z n
0
Pt(zH)1￿￿dzH
￿ 1
1￿￿
(14)
PF;t =
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0
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(15)
PR;t = P￿
H;tP
1￿￿
F;t (16)
PT;t = PR;t + !PN;t (17)
PC;t = P
￿
T;tP
1￿￿
N;t (18)
The optimization problem, demand functions and price indexes for the foreign economy are de￿ned in an
analogous way.
2.1.2 Investment decisions
Households spend part of their income on a homogenous investment good, which is transformed into the
capital stock Kt+1 according to the formula:
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + "I
t
￿
1 ￿ S(
It
It￿1
)
￿
It (19)
where ￿ is the depreciation rate. As in Christiano et al. (2005), capital accumulation is subject to
investment-speci￿c technological progress "I
t and adjustment cost represented by function S(￿), which satis￿es
the following properties: S(1) = S0(1) = 0, S00(￿) ￿ S00 > 0.
The ￿rst order conditions to the consumer￿ s maximization problem imply:
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= 0 (20)
QT;t = Et
￿
Rk
t+1
PC;t+1
PC;t+1
PC;tRt
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)Et
￿
PC;t+1
PC;tRt
QT;t+1
￿
(21)
Equation (20) can be interpreted as investment demand, while equation (21) determines the price of
installed capital, de￿ned as:
QT;t ￿
￿K;t
￿C;tPC;t
(22)
where ￿C;t is the marginal utility of consumption (which is the Lagrange multiplier on households￿budget
constraint) and ￿K;t is the Lagrange multiplier on the capital law of motion.
The homogeneous investment good is produced in a similar fashion as the ￿nal consumption good, except
that there are no distribution costs associated with supplying its tradable component,8 which implies the
following de￿nitions:
It =
I
￿I
R;tI
1￿￿I
N;t
￿
￿I
I (1 ￿ ￿I)1￿￿I
(23)
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8This is motivated by the evidence provided by Burstein et al. (2003).
5Hence, while we allow for di⁄erences in the tradable-nontradable composition between the ￿nal consump-
tion basket and the investment basket (i.e. ￿c need not be equal to ￿i), we assume that the structure of
the purely tradable component is identical for both types of goods. This simpli￿es calibration discussed in
section 4.
2.1.3 Wage setting
Each household in the home country supplies monopolistically one distinctive type of labour L(j), which is
aggregated with labour services of other households into a homogenous labour input according to the formula:
Lt =
"￿
1
n
￿ 1
￿ Z n
0
Lt(j)
￿￿1
￿
# ￿
￿￿1
(26)
We follow Erceg et al. (2000) and assume that only a fraction 1￿￿W of households can renegotiate their
wage contracts in each period, while wages of the remaining households are partially indexed to the past CPI
in￿ ation:
Wt(j) = Wt￿1(j)
￿
PC;t￿1
PC;t￿2
￿￿W
(27)
Households that are allowed to reset their wages take into account that they may not be allowed to do so
for some time, so they solve the following optimization problem:
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subject to the sequence of labour demand constraints:
Lt+k(j) =
1
n
"
Wt(j)
Wt+k
￿
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￿￿W
#￿￿
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where the aggregate wage index is given by:
Wt =
￿
1
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Z n
0
Wt(j)1￿￿dj
￿ 1
1￿￿
(30)
The ￿rst-order condition associated with the optimization problem (28) can be written as:
Et
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#
"d;t+k (Ct+k(j) ￿ hCt+k￿1)
￿￿ Lt+k(j) = 0 (31)
where MRSt is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour de￿ned as:
MRSt(j) =
"l;tLt(j)’
"d;t (Ct(j) ￿ hCt￿1)
￿￿ (32)
Since all households that can renegotiate their wage contracts face an identical optimization problem,
they set the same optimal wage ~ Wt, which implies the following formula for the evolution of the aggregate
wage index:
Wt =
2
4￿W
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￿￿W
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3
5
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(33)
The wage setting problem faced by foreign households is similar and leads to an analogous ￿rst-order
condition and aggregate wage law of motion to those given by equations (31) and (33). Yet, the structural
parameters governing the wage setting (￿W and ￿W) are allowed to vary across countries.
62.2 Firms
2.2.1 Production technology
There exist a continuum of identically monopolistic competitive ￿rms in each of the tradable and nontradable
sectors of the domestic economy. The production technology is homogenous with respect to labour and capital
inputs:
Yt(zN) = "aN;tLt(zN)1￿￿Kt(zN)￿ (34)
Yt(zH) = "aH;tLt(zH)1￿￿Kt(zH)￿ (35)
where ￿ is output elasticity with respect to capital (common across sectors but not necessarily across
countries), while "aN;t and "aH;t are sector speci￿c productivity parameters. The output index in each sector
is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators:
YN;t =
"￿
1
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￿ Z n
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￿ dzN
# ￿
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(36)
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(37)
Since all ￿rms operate technologies with the same relative intensity of productive factors and face the same
prices for labour and capital inputs, cost minimization implies the following capital-labour ratio, identical
across all domestic ￿rms:
WtLt
Rk
tKt
=
1 ￿ ￿
￿
(38)
2.2.2 Price setting
Firms set their prices according to a modi￿ed version of the Calvo (1983) staggering mechanism. Only a
fraction 1￿￿N of ￿rms producing nontradable goods set their prices in a forward-looking manner, while the
prices of ￿rms that do not receive a price signal are indexed to the past in￿ ation according to the following
rule:
Pt(zN) = Pt￿1(zN)
￿
PN;t￿1
PN;t￿2
￿￿N
(39)
where ￿N is the degree of indexation in nontradable prices.
Firms that are allowed to reoptimize their prices realize that they may not be allowed to do so for some
time, hence their price-setting problem is to maximize the expected present discounted value of future pro￿ts:
Et
1 X
k=0
￿
k
N￿
k￿t+kYt+k(zN)
"
Pt(zN)
￿
PN;t+k￿1
PN;t￿1
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￿ PN;t+kMCt+k
#
(40)
subject to the sequence of demand constraints:
Yt+k(zN) =
1
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PN;t+k￿1
PN;t￿1
￿￿N
#￿￿
YN;t+k (41)
where ￿t is the marginal utility of households￿nominal income (exogenous to ￿rms) and MCt is the real
marginal cost (identical across ￿rms from a given sector since factor markets are homogenous) de￿ned as:
MCt =
1
PN;t"aN;t
￿
Wt
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿￿ ￿
Rk
t
￿
￿￿
(42)
7The ￿rst-order condition associated with the pro￿t-maximization problem faced by reoptimizing ￿rms
can be written as:
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There are no ￿rm-speci￿c shocks in the model, so all ￿rms that are allowed to reset their price in a
forward-looking manner select the same optimal price ~ PN;t, which implies the following expression for the
evolution of the home nontradable goods price index:
PN;t =
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The price-setting problem solved by home ￿rms producing tradable goods and ￿rms in the foreign country
is similar and leads to ￿rst-order conditions and price indices analogous to equation (43) and (44), respectively.
Yet, structural parameters governing the pricing behaviour (￿ and ￿), as well as stochastic properties of
productivity shocks, are allowed to vary across countries and sectors.
We assume that prices are set in the producer currency and that the international law of one price holds
for raw tradable goods at the dock. Therefore, the price of home goods sold abroad and that of foreign goods
sold domestically are given by:
P￿
H;t = ER
￿1
t PH;t PF;t = ERtP￿
F;t (45)
where ERt is the nominal exchange rate expressed as units of domestic currency per one unit of foreign
currency.
2.3 International risk sharing
Assuming complete markets implies the following perfect risk-sharing condition (see Chari et al., 2002):
Qt = ￿
"￿
d;t
"d;t
￿
C￿
t ￿ h￿C￿
t￿1
￿￿￿
￿
(Ct ￿ hCt￿1)
￿￿ (46)
where ￿ is a constant depending on initial conditions and Qt is the real exchange rate de￿ned as:
Qt =
ERtP￿
C;t
PC;t
(47)
The real exchange rate is allowed to deviate from the purchasing power parity (PPP) due to changes
in relative prices of tradable vs. nontradable goods in both countries (so-called internal exchange rates),
changes in relative distribution costs and changes in terms-of-trade, as long as there is some home bias in
preferences (￿ 6= ￿￿). This can be demonstrated using the price indices derived above and the law of one
price conditions for raw tradable goods:
Qt = S
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￿
t
1 + !￿D￿
t
1 + !Dt
X
￿1￿￿
￿
t
X
1￿￿
t
(48)
where terms-of-trade St are de￿ned as home import prices relative to home export prices:
St =
ERtP￿
F;t
PH;t
(49)
the internal exchange rates Xt and X￿
t are de￿ned as:
Xt =
PN;t
PT;t
X￿
t =
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N;t
P￿
T;t
(50)
and relative distribution costs are given by:
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(51)
2.4 Monetary and ￿scal authorities
We assume that monetary authorities in both countries respond to the economic conditions through the
following interest-rate feedback rules:
Rt = R
￿
t￿1
"￿
Yt
￿ Y
￿￿y ￿
PC;t
(1 + ￿ ￿)PC;t￿1
￿￿￿
#1￿￿
"m;t (52)
where ￿ Y is steady state output, ￿ ￿ is steady state CPI in￿ ation and "m;t is a monetary policy shock.
Fiscal authorities are modelled in a very simplistic fashion: government expenditures and transfers to
the households are fully ￿nanced by lump sum taxes, so that the state budget is balanced each period. The
government spending is fully directed at nontradable goods and is modelled as a stochastic process "g;t. Given
our representative agent assumption, Ricardian equivalence holds in the model.
2.5 Market clearing conditions
The model is closed by imposing the following market clearing conditions. Output of each ￿rm producing
non-tradable goods is either consumed domestically, spent on investment or used for distribution services or
purchased by the government. Similarly, all tradable goods are consumed or invested domestically or abroad.
Using these conditions together with demand functions (10), (11), (12), the output indexes given by (36),
(37) and their analogs for investment goods, one can write the aggregate output in the two sectors at home
as:
YN;t = (1 ￿ ￿c)
￿
PN;t
Pt
￿￿1
Ct + !￿c
￿
PT;t
PC;t
￿￿1
Ct + (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
PN;t
PI;t
￿￿1
It + Gt (53)
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where in (53) we make use of the following optimality condition linking distribution services with tradable
consumption goods:
YD;t = !CT;t (55)
Market clearing conditions for the foreign economy are derived in a similar fashion.
Finally, equilibrium in factor markets requires:
Lt =
Z n
0
Lt(zN) +
Z n
0
Lt(zH) (56)
Kt =
Z n
0
Kt(zN) +
Z n
0
Kt(zH) (57)
92.6 Log-linearized model
The model does not have a closed-form solution. Therefore, we log-linearize it around the non-stochastic
steady state. The full list of log-linearized model equations is available in the technical appendix.
Our two-country model is driven by fourteen stochastic shocks, seven for each country. Preference, labour
supply, government spending, investment e¢ ciency and productivity shocks in the two sectors are assumed
to follow ￿rst-order autoregressive processes, while monetary policy shocks are assumed to be white noise.
Monetary policy shocks and the IID innovations to the remaining types of shocks are allowed to be correlated
across countries.
3 Estimation
3.1 Data considerations
The model is ￿tted to the data using fourteen macroeconomic variables, seven for each country. The estima-
tion sample covers the period 1996q2-2007q2, which makes 45 quarterly observations for each variable. The
indicators considered are: (real) GDP private consumption, investment, CPI, the internal exchange rate,9
the real wage rate (all expressed as log changes) and the nominal short-term (3 month) interest rate. All
variables are seasonally adjusted (except for interest rates) and demeaned prior to estimation. Additionally,
the CPI in￿ ation and interest rate series for Poland were detrended with the in￿ ation target data, which was
constructed using monetary policy guidelines published by the NBP.
All data for the euro area come from Eurostat. The time series for Poland were taken from the ECMOD
database, maintained at the NBP. The only exception is tradable and non-tradable goods in￿ ation, the source
of which is Eurostat.
3.2 Bayesian estimation
We ￿t our model using a Bayesian approach, which consists in placing a priori distribution p(￿) on the
structural parameters ￿, the estimates of which are then updated using the data Z according to the Bayes
rule:
p(￿jZ) =
p(Zj￿)p(￿)
p(Z)
/ L(￿jZ)p(￿) (58)
where L(￿jZ) = P(Zj￿) is the likelihood function, p(￿jZ) is the posterior distribution of parameters
and p(Z) is the marginal likelihood (marginal data density) de￿ned as:
p(Z) =
Z
p(Zj￿)p(￿)d￿ (59)
Our model forms a linear system with rational expectations, the solution to which is of the form:
Ht = A1(￿)Ht￿1 + A2(￿)"t (60)
"t = A3(￿)"t￿1 + A4(￿)￿t (61)
where Ht is a vector of endogenous variables, "t is a vector of stochastic disturbances, ￿t groups innovations
to stochastic disturbances and Ai, i = 1;2;3;4, are matrices depending on the parameters of the model. The
measurement equation, linking observable variables used in the estimation (Zt) with endogenous variables of
the model can be written as:
Zt = BHt (62)
where B is a deterministic matrix.
9Prices of non-tradable goods relative to prices of tradable goods are based on the HICP basket, with services and energy
goods treated as nontradable, while the remaining components assumed to be tradable.
10Equation (62) together with the system of state equations (60), (61) form the state-space representation
of the model, the likelihood of which can be evaluated using the Kalman ￿lter. Obtaining the analytical
expression for the likelihood function is generally not possible. However, the posterior distribution of the
model parameters can be constructed numerically by applying the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
methods. We compute the posterior moments of the parameters using a su¢ ciently large number of draws,
having made sure that the MCMC algorithm converged.
3.3 Calibrated parameters and prior distributions
Since our sample is rather short, we calibrate rather than estimate those structural parameters of our model,
for which we have relatively good information or which are known to be weakly identi￿ed in this type of
models. This strategy can be seen as equivalent to imposing very strict priors on a subset of parameters.
Such a mixed approach is quite common in the literature and may lead to more e¢ cient estimates of the
non-calibrated parameters (see Canova, 2007).
We set the parameter governing the relative size of Poland and the euro area n to 0.029, which is the value
implied by nominal GDP levels, averaged over the period 1997-2006. The share of ￿nal tradable consumption
goods in Poland ￿c and in the euro area ￿￿
c is set to 0.61 and 0.52, respectively. This corresponds to the
average shares of services and energy goods in the HICP baskets for both countries over 1997-2006. The
distribution cost parameters ! and !￿ are calibrated at 1, which follows the discussion in Burstein et al.
(2003) and implies the share of distribution services in the total price of ￿nal tradable consumption goods of
50%. The share of tradable investment goods in Poland ￿i and in the euro area ￿￿
i are set to 0.45 and 0.48,
respectively, which corresponds to the respective average shares of non-construction works in total investment
expenditures over the period 1997-2006, taken from Eurostat. The share of Polish goods in the raw tradable
baskets are calculated using the data on bilateral trade ￿ ows between Poland and the euro area, assuming
the import content of exports at 32%, which is roughly the value implied by the input-output tables. This
gives ￿ = 0:6 for Poland and ￿￿ = 0:015 for the euro area.
We set the discount factor in each country (￿ and ￿
￿) to its conventional value of 0.99, implying an annual
steady-state real interest rate of 4%. The quarterly depreciation rates ￿ and ￿￿ are calibrated at 0.025, which
is close to the values assumed in the standard business cycle literature. The output elasticity of capital input
in Poland ￿ and in the euro area ￿￿ is set to 0.33 and 0.3, respectively. This roughly corresponds to one
minus labour shares in both economies, corrected for implicit labour income of self-employed persons. Given
well-known problems with the identi￿cation of the elasticity of substitution across di⁄erent varieties of labour
(￿ and ￿
￿), we follow Smets and Wouters (2003) and set this parameter equal to 3, which implies a wage
mark-up of 50%.
Steady state shares of consumption, government spending and investment in total output correspond to
domestic demand ratios of private consumption, public consumption and gross capital formation, respectively,
taken from Eurostat and averaged over the period 1997-2006. Steady state output shares of tradable and
nontradable production are straightforward to derive using the calibrations described so far.
We choose the type and parametrization of the prior distributions for the euro area relying largely on
earlier contributions to Bayesian estimation of DSGE models, including Smets and Wouters (2003), Lubik
and Schorfheide (2006), Jondeau and Sahuc (2005) and Pytlarczyk (2005).10 For lack of relevant studies on
Poland, prior distributions for most of parameters describing the Polish economy are chosen to be the same as
their euro area counterparts. An important exception are standard deviations of the stochastic disturbances,
which are assumed to be three times larger than in the euro area. This is roughly the magnitude implied by
the cross-country di⁄erences in volatility of the observable variables used in the estimation. Finally, given
evidence on relatively weak correlation between structural shocks within the euro area (see e.g. Jondeau and
Sahuc, 2005), we ￿nd it reasonable to set the mean of the prior distribution for the relevant shock correlations
between Poland and the euro area to zero rather than to a positive value, with a relatively large standard
deviation.
10We make a slight departure from the earlier studies in the case of parameters describing the degree of indexation in price and
wage setting, chosing their prior means equal to 0.5 rather than around 0.75 and making their distributions less informative. This
was motivated by the results of preliminary estimations using the more conventional parametrization: they yielded a posteriori
estimates with variance not much di⁄erent (or even lower) to that of the prior distribution, signalling a potential problem with
the priors. Similar considerations motivate assuming slightly higher prior mean of output weight in the monetary policy reaction
function (2 vs. conventional 1.5) and intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1.5 vs. more standard 1).
113.4 Estimation results
The complete set of estimation results, including information on prior distributions, is reported in Table 1
(structural parameters) and Table 2 (shocks).11 The posterior maximization is performed using the csminwel,
which is a numerical routine developed by Sims (2002). The posterior parameter space is explored using the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.12 The reported estimates are obtained from the last 200,000 draws out of
the total of 800,000 runs.13
[Table 1 and Table 2 about here]
Overall, all structural parameters except for those related to the degree of price indexation are estimated
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This is also true for standard deviations and autoregressive parameters of
stochastic disturbances, but not necessarily so for correlations of some types of shocks across Poland and the
euro area. Judging by the comparisons between prior and posterior distributions (see Figure 1 and 2), the data
seems to be quite informative for most of parameters. The only parameters for which the prior distribution
is essentially not updated are elasticity of labour supply in both countries and inertia of productivity shock
in the euro area nontradable sector. It has to be noted, however, that the posterior distributions cannot
be regarded as very tight for all parameters. In particular, the variance of posterior estimates of some
parameters is very close to that of the relevant prior distributions. This is particularly true for the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, in￿ ation weight in the monetary policy rule and the parameters governing the
law of motion of labour supply shocks. All in all, it is fair to say that there is a sizable amount of uncertainty
surrounding some of our estimates.
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here]
In what follows, we ￿rst focus on point estimates of the structural parameters (using posterior means)
and a visual inspection of shapes of their marginal posterior distributions. A more formal examination of
heterogeneity between our two model economies is postponed to section 5.
3.4.1 Structural parameters
Starting from parameters characterizing the utility function, we do not ￿nd sizable di⁄erences between Poland
and the euro area. The external habit in consumption seems to be somewhat larger in Poland, while the
cross-country discrepancies between implied elasticities of intertemporal substitution and of labour supply
are negligible. Similarly, there seems to be a high degree of homogeneity between the two countries in terms
of curvature of the capital adjustment cost function. All four pairs of parameters fall well within the range
implied by earlier estimates obtained for the euro area or other developed economies.
Turning to the set of parameters governing the degree of price and wage stickiness, the heterogeneity
across our two model economies is more pronounced. According to our estimates, wage indexation to past
in￿ ation in Poland is more than twice as large as that in the euro area. This suggests that second round
e⁄ects should be of relatively bigger concern to authorities pursuing price stabilization policies in Poland. It
has to be noted, however, that the degree of wage indexation in both countries is rather moderate if compared
to previous studies. Similarly, our results point at relatively weak indexation mechanisms in the price setting
behaviour in both countries, with only slightly higher weight on past in￿ ation in Poland￿ s tradable sector
relative to that prevailing in the euro area.
As regards Calvo probability estimates, our results are quite mixed. We ￿nd that wages are less sticky in
Poland, tradable goods prices are somewhat more ￿ exible in the euro area, while a similar degree of Calvo
stickiness across the two economies can be observed for prices of nontradables. If compared with earlier
studies relying on estimated DSGE models, our results point at much weaker Calvo stickiness in the euro
area price setting behaviour. For instance, Smets and Wouters (2003) and Pytlarczyk (2005) estimate the
average duration of the price contracts at two and a half or four years, respectively. Our results suggest a
11The software used is dynare, which is a set of routines for solving and estimating models with forward-looking variables,
developed at CEPREMAP. For details on the current version of the software, see http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare.
12See Chib and Greenberg (1995) for an excellent exposition to this algorithm.
13Convergence of the Markov chains generated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm was assessed qualitatively using diagnostic
charts developed by Brooks and Gelman (1998).
12frequency of price changes of around three and a half quarters (weighted average for tradable and nontradable
goods), which is very close to estimates obtained from microeconomic surveys for the euro area (see Altissimo
et al., 2006).
Our estimation delivers similar long run monetary feedback rules in both economies, with that for Poland
exhibiting a slightly higher weight of output relative to in￿ ation. An important di⁄erence concerns the degree
of interest rate smoothing, which seems to be more important in the euro area. For both economies, the
estimated monetary policy reaction functions satisfy the so-called Taylor principle, i.e. the long run response
to in￿ ation exceeds one.
3.4.2 Shock parameters
The point posterior estimates of autoregressive coe¢ cients of shock processes suggest that their inertia in
Poland is larger than in the euro area. The only exception is the labour supply shock, which seems to
be somewhat more persistent in the latter region. It has to be noted, however, that the di⁄erences across
countries do not seem to be very large if one takes into account the precision of posterior distributions.
The posterior estimates of shock volatilities con￿rm our prior assumption about their heterogeneity across
the two countries. Standard deviations of stochastic disturbances are on average more than three and a half
times higher in Poland than in the euro area. The largest discrepancy between shock volatilities across the
two countries concerns the government spending shock, which is ￿ve times more volatile in Poland than in
the euro area. The least heterogeneous disturbance is the productivity shock in the nontradable sector, but
still its standard deviation in Poland turns out more than two and a half times larger than in the euro area.
We do not ￿nd any evidence for signi￿cant cross-country correlation of productivity shocks in tradables,
government spending shocks and monetary policy shocks. Preference, labour supply and investment e¢ ciency
shocks turn out to be positively correlated, while productivity shocks in the nontradable sector are negatively
correlated. Overall, our results suggest that structural shocks are rather weakly correlated across Poland and
the euro area. It has to be noted, however, that the shocks are probably far from being perfectly correlated
even between highly integrated EMU countries.14 For instance, using a more parsimonious DSGE setup with
three stochastic disturbances, Jondeau and Sahuc (2005) ￿nd very weak correlation across shocks hitting the
largest euro area countries (Germany, Italy and France).15 Their results are broadly con￿rmed by a less
parsimonious study by Pytlarczyk (2005), focusing on the links between Germany and the rest of the euro
area.
3.5 Alternative priors
While the main merit of the Bayesian approach is the possibility to incorporate a priori knowledge into the
estimation procedure, the choice of the prior might signi￿cantly a⁄ect the posterior results if the sample size
is short or if some of the model parameters are not identi￿ed. Therefore, it is important to check to what
extent our results are driven by the imposed prior assumptions.
Ideally, one could reestimate the model using uninformative prior distributions, e.g. by following the
restricted maximum likelihood approach.16 Unfortunately, the results are rarely satisfactory, i.e. the maxi-
mization of the likelihood is imprecise due to the presence of large ￿ at regions and the parameter estimates
tend to settle on the boundaries of the prior range. In our case, these problems turn out to be severe enough
to make the estimation relying on uninformative priors for all parameters virtually infeasible. Hence, we per-
form our sensitivity analysis in several steps, each time imposing uniform prior distributions for a di⁄erent
subset of the estimated parameters.
If we replace our baseline prior distributions for the utility function parameters and the capital adjustment
cost curvature, the precision of the estimates drops dramatically. While in this case comparing the estimated
posterior modes to those from the baseline is of little use, we note that the inverse of the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution for both countries tends to approach the upper bound (set at 3) and the habit
persistence coe¢ cient in the euro area drops by half.
14One can expect that the observed and estimated correlations can be to some extent weakened by idiosyncratic measurement
errors in the data.
15The highest correlation obtained by Jondeau and Sahuc (2005) in their baseline (unrestricted) model concerns preference
shocks between Germany and France, but is estimated at only 0.313.
16See e.g. Onatski and Williams (2004) who reestimate the Smets and Wouters (2003) model using uniform prior distributions.
13Assigning uniform distributions to the priors for parameters describing price and wage formation has the
largest impact on the indexation coe¢ cients. The degree of price indexation in both tradable and nontradable
sectors is on the zero bound for both countries, while the wage indexation parameters fall by more than half.
Calvo probabilities in nontradable sectors and in wage setting are virtually una⁄ected, while the estimated
degree of price stickiness in each country￿ s tradable sector turns out lower than in our baseline speci￿cation.
The remaining parameters of the model do not change in a signi￿cant way.
Assuming uninformative priors for all monetary policy feedback parameters lowers the precision of the
estimates. This is entirely due to problems with the relative weight of output and in￿ ation in the euro
area, which tend to be driven towards zero and the upper limit, respectively, whenever the other parameter
is somewhat tied by an informative prior. If we reestablish informative priors for these parameters, the
remaining ones (including the interest rate smoothing) are estimated very close to our baseline speci￿cation.
By allowing the prior distributions for serial correlation of the stochastic disturbances to be uniformly
distributed over the unit interval we obtain half lower inertia for the productivity shock in the euro area
tradable sector, while the government spending shock in this region turns out to be more persistent. In both
countries, labour shocks are now estimated to be less inertial and more volatile. The remaining parameters
are broadly una⁄ected.
Somewhat surprisingly, our results are relatively little a⁄ected if we assume uninformative priors for
volatilities of the shocks. The only di⁄erence is somewhat higher variance of the tradable sector productivity,
demand, labour supply and investment e¢ ciency shocks in Poland.
Finally, we report that the estimation results turn out robust to the choice of priors for the cross correlation
of the shocks. If anything, assuming uniform distributions for this group of parameters only slightly drives
the estimates away from zero compared to our baseline speci￿cation.
All in all, we conclude that the prior distributions play an important role in estimation of some of our
structural parameters, while they impinge far less on the estimates of parameters governing inertia, volatility
and cross correlation of stochastic disturbances.
4 Model evaluation
4.1 Dynamic properties
4.1.1 Variance decomposition
We start the evaluation of dynamic properties of our model with discussing the results of the variance de-
composition, based on means of parameter posterior distributions. The contribution of each of the structural
shocks to the forecast error variance of the selected endogenous variables for Poland are presented in Tables
3 to 9.17
[Table 3 to 9 about here]
It is apparent that most of the volatility of the main macrovariables in Poland is explained by idiosyncratic
disturbances hitting the Polish economy, while the contribution of shocks originating in the euro area is
rather limited. Generally, long run variations in the variables are driven almost entirely by supply shocks
(i.e. productivity, investment e¢ ciency and labour supply shocks), while in the short run there is also an
important role for demand shocks.
Taking a closer look at short run determinants of volatility in the main variables, one can observe that
the main source of output variations are government spending shocks and productivity shocks. Consumption
and investment are mainly driven by preference and investment e¢ ciency shocks, respectively. The dominant
source of ￿ uctuations in real wages are labour supply disturbances. Short run movements in the real exchange
rate are signi￿cantly a⁄ected by virtually all shocks originating in Poland and the euro area productivity in
the nontradable sector. Productivity shocks are the main factors behind variations in in￿ ation. The same
holds true for nominal interest rates, with the exception that in this case there is also an important role for
monetary policy shocks.
17Since our model allows for cross-country correlation of shocks, we need to orthogonalize them before calculating variance
decompositions and impulse response functions. This is done through a Cholesky decomposition of the shock covariance matrix,
with the ordering that assigns all comovement of shocks to those originating in the euro area.
14Overall, the results of the variance decomposition in our model do not seem to deviate much from those
obtained in other studies if one takes into account di⁄erences in the model structure. For instance, while
interpreting the apparently high role of productivity disturbances in accounting for in￿ ation volatility in our
model, one should keep in mind that we do not include mark-up shocks as a separate source of ￿ uctuations.
One can therefore expect that some of the movements in productivity shocks identi￿ed in our model re￿ ect
also time-varying pricing power of the ￿rms.18
4.1.2 Impulse response analysis
Figures 3 to 16 plot the impulse responses to orthogonalized innovations in stochastic disturbances for a set
of selected variables. Similarly to the variance decomposition analysis, the parameters of the simulated model
correspond to their posterior means.
[Figure 3 to 16 about here]
As one could expect, given the di⁄erence in size between our two model economies and the Cholesky
ordering in orthogonalization, shocks originating in Poland have a negligible e⁄ect for the euro area, while
the opposite holds true for the impact of euro area shocks on the Polish economy. Overall, the impulse
responses in our model have a rather intuitive explanation in qualitative terms and are broadly in line
with those obtained in other open economy DSGE models with sticky prices. Below we describe the main
propagation mechanisms for each stochastic disturbance. It has to be kept in mind that, given the general
equilibrium and forward looking nature of the model, the following description involves a considerable degree
of simpli￿cation.
Productivity shocks originating in Poland lead to an expansion in this country￿ s output, consumption,
investment and real wages. Because of the presence of nominal rigidities, the response of labour input is
negative (see e.g. Gali, 1999). Falling marginal costs cause a decline in in￿ ation, to which the central
bank reacts by lowering interest rates. The exchange rate depreciates in response to both tradable and
nontradable shocks, which in the former case means that the home bias channel dominates the e⁄ect of
changes in the internal exchange rate and relative distribution costs. Given the estimated di⁄erences in
inertia, the persistence of the nontradable productivity shock is much higher than that of the productivity
shock in the tradable sector.
Productivity shocks originating in the euro area have non-negligible e⁄ects for both economies. Except for
output, the euro area tradable sector disturbances lead to qualitatively similar responses of the main variables
in both economies. This is not the case for the euro area nontradable sector productivity disturbance, which
leads to negative comovements in the main macrocategories. To large extent, this is due to negative cross-
country correlation of this type of shock. If we set the correlation to zero, only output and investment respond
in the opposite direction.
The consumption preference shock in Poland leads to expansion in output, driven by higher consumption
on the demand side and increased labour input on the supply side. Investment is crowded out. Following the
appreciation of the exchange rate, in￿ ation declines on impact and then rises, which causes a hike in interest
rates. Given the perfect risk sharing structure of our model and positive cross correlation of the shocks,
the response of the main macrovariables to the euro area consumption shock is qualitatively similar in both
countries.
Following a negative labour supply shock in Poland, i.e. an increase in the weight of leisure in consumers￿
utility, labour input declines, which translates into lower consumption, investment and output. Growth in
real wages leads to an increase in marginal costs and higher in￿ ation, in response to which interest rates go
up. Since the cross-country correlation of labour supply shocks is positive, the reaction of all major variables
to the euro area labour supply shock is of the same direction in Poland and the euro area.
An unexpected rise in government spending leads to expansion in output and crowding out of private
consumption and investment.19 Similarly as after the labour supply shock, the exchange rate appreciates,
18This should be also kept in mind while interpreting our estimates of near zero cross country correlation of productivity
shocks in the tradable sector, which may be viewed as surprisingly low if compared to the standard parametrization used in the
international business cycle literature (see Backus et al., 1992).
19It may be argued that the negative response of private consumption to an increase in government spending is inconsistent
with the empirical evidence, indicating a positive comovement of both categories. In a DSGE framework, this e⁄ect can be
15causing a short-lived fall in in￿ ation, the subsequent rise of which sparks reaction of the monetary authority.
The government spending shock hitting the euro area causes positive comovements in the main macrovariables
in both economies.
In response to an investment e¢ ciency shock, output and investment expand. Initially negative reaction
of consumption, accompanied by appreciation of the exchange rate, turns positive after about two years.
Like in the case of other positive supply shocks, in￿ ation declines. Again, the spillovers from the euro area
investment e¢ ciency shock are such that the response of the main variables in Poland is similar to that in
the euro area.
The reaction to unexpected monetary policy tightening is standard. Declining consumption pushes down
output, investment and labour input. The exchange rate appreciates, driving down in￿ ation. Except for the
initially positive impact of a surprise drop in in￿ ation, real wages contract, leading to further price decline.
Due to a relatively strong exchange rate channel, monetary contraction in the euro area has expansionary
e⁄ects in Poland, though short-lived in terms of output and in￿ ation.
4.2 Empirical performance
While obtaining the highest possible data ￿t was not the primary objective of building our model, it may be
useful to take a look at two standard outputs of the estimation procedure obtained with the Kalman ￿lter.
First, by applying a two-sided smoothing of the data we can obtain the time series for historical stochastic
disturbances, identi￿ed given the model structure. These are plotted in Figure 17.
[Figure 17 about here]
A ￿rst look at the graphs con￿rms what we already stressed before: the magnitude of shocks hitting Poland
is substantially larger than the size of shocks identi￿ed for the euro area. Focusing our attention on Poland, the
estimates suggest that productivity in the tradable sector was relatively high in the middle of our sample and
remained below average in the last three years. Roughly speaking, the opposite holds true for productivity in
the nontradable sector and government spending shocks. Consumption preference and investment e¢ ciency
are clearly higher in the ￿rst part of our sample.20 Labour supply and monetary shocks do not exhibit such
clear patterns, although the latter suggests a somewhat tighter monetary approach in the middle of our
sample compared to more recent years. Given the unobservable nature of the stochastic processes, assessing
the plausibility of their identi￿cation always involves a great deal of subjectivity. Therefore, we stop at this
stage and do not attempt to link the evolution of the shocks to selected events and processes documented for
the two economies.
The second popular and simple tool to assess the empirical performance of a DSGE model is to cast its
one-side Kalman ￿lter predictions of the observable variables against their realizations (see Figure 18).
[Figure 18 about here]
Concentrating again on the results for Poland, our model does a good job at tracking interest rates and
in￿ ation. Clearly, the model fails to account for the sharp and persistent slowdown in the economy in the
middle of our sample and to capture volatility in real wage growth. All in all, the overall in-sample ￿t of our
model seems to be acceptable if one takes into account a highly restrictive nature of the DSGE framework.
It is worth noting that the empirical performance of our model seems to be signi￿cantly better in the last
years of the sample. This is particularly true for GDP, consumption and real wage growth.
5 Testing sources of heterogeneity
In order to assess the degree of heterogeneity between Poland and the euro area in a more formal way, we
estimate several restricted versions of our model and compare it to its fully-￿ edged, unrestricted speci￿ca-
tion. As indicated in the introduction, the Bayesian approach to estimation provides a natural platform for
obtained by assuming that a su¢ ciently large share of consumers behaves in a non-Ricardian way (see e.g. Gali et al., 2007). A
less popular alternative is to allow for so-called deep habits in government spending (see Ravn et al., 2006).
20Consumption preference and investment e¢ ciency shocks in our model have their relatively close counterparts in SOE-PL,
which is a small open economy model developed by Adolfson et al. (2005) and estimated on the Polish data by Grabek et al.
(2007). It is quite reassuring that the evolution in time of these disturbances roughly coincides in the two models.
16comparisons across potentially misspeci￿ed models.21 Formally, this can be done by assigning prior proba-
bilities to competing models and then using the Bayes￿theorem to see how probable each model is given the
data. Taking the ratio of the posterior probability for a given model to that of the reference model gives the
posterior odds on the latter. In practice, the prior probabilities of each competing model are often assumed
to be the same, in which case the posterior odds reduce to the Bayes factor, de￿ned as the ratio of marginal
likelihoods (see formula (59)) of the competing models.22
Calculating the marginal likelihood of a model is far from straightforward. There are two popular ap-
proaches to this problem (see Schorfheide, 2002). First, one can assume that the posterior kernel shape is close
to normal, which yields the so-called Laplace approximation. The other method, typically referred to as the
harmonic mean estimator, relies on simulating the marginal density function using the algorithm developed
by Geweke (1999). The clear advantage of the former technique is its computational e¢ ciency: all what is
needed is the posterior maximization, while the harmonic mean estimator needs running the time-consuming
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Since the number of restrictions we want to test is rather large, we calculate
the marginal likelihood of various versions of our model using the Laplace approximation.23
Our strategy to testing the sources of heterogeneity between Poland and the euro area can be described
as follows. In the ￿rst step, we test for cross country di⁄erences parameter by parameter.24 Next we consider
several tests of multiple hypotheses. The results are reported in Table 10.
[Table 10 about here]
In what follows, we base our inference on the scheme suggested by Kass and Raftery (1995), which is a
modi￿cation of classical rules laid down by Je⁄reys (1961). In particular, if the Bayes factor with respect to
the unrestricted model is lower than 1/3 (1/20, 1/150), we treat it as positive (strong, very strong) evidence
for heterogeneity between Poland and the euro area. It has to be noted that the marginal likelihood penalizes
the model ￿t by a measure of its complexity. It means that it is perfectly possible that a restricted model
will score better compared to its unrestricted version. In this case, the evidence in favour of homogeneity is
judged in a symmetric fashion to that described above, with the cut-o⁄ points at 3, 20 and 150.
Given these inference rules and starting from simple hypotheses, we do not ￿nd strong evidence neither
for nor against homogeneity in structural parameters and shock inertia coe¢ cients. The only exception is
the degree of interest rate smoothing, which is signi￿cantly di⁄erent between Poland and the euro area.
This is mostly due to the fact that these parameters are estimated with relatively low precision. On the
contrary, our results speak strongly or very strongly in favour of heterogeneity in volatilities of most shock
processes. Only in the case of nontradable sector productivity and labour supply shocks is the evidence for
heterogeneity weak, despite substantial di⁄erences in point estimates. Finally, all simple hypotheses of nearly
perfect cross-country shock correlations are very strongly rejected by the data.
Turning to multiple hypotheses, our results speak strongly for structural homogeneity across Poland
and the euro area: the model restricting the structural parameters (excluding the parametrization of the
monetary policy reaction function) to be equal in both economies ￿ts the data signi￿cantly better than a
model assuming that all of them are di⁄erent. Despite strong evidence in favour of heterogeneity between
interest rate smoothing pointed out above, the model assuming identical monetary policy feedback rules in
Poland and in the euro area turns out to be as good as our baseline speci￿cation. Our results speak strongly
against full stochastic homogeneity: shock volatilities di⁄er across countries in a signi￿cant way and they
are very far from being perfectly synchronized. It has to be noted that lack of cross correlation of stochastic
disturbances is rejected by the data as well, although not as strongly as the perfect correlation hypothesis.
Hence, our results should be viewed as suggesting moderate interdependence of shocks between Poland and
the euro area.
21See e.g. Landon-Lane (1998).
22Since the marginal likelihood of a model is directly related to the predictive density of the model, it provides a natural
platform for model comparisons based on the data ￿t. See e.g. Lancaster (2004).
23As a robustness check, we assess the marginal data density for our key restricted speci￿cations using the harmonic mean
estimator. The conclusions one can draw from comparing them to the unrestricted version are qualitatively the same as those
obtained using the Laplace approximation.
24Testing for perfect synchronization of shocks cannot be done in a straightforward manner, since imposing a unity restriction
on any cross correlation e⁄ectively reduces the number of shocks, which leads to a well-known problem of stochastic singularity,
as long as all observable variables are used in the estimation. To deal with this problem, we approximate the synchronized
versions of our model by setting cross correlations of the relevant shocks to 0.95.
176 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to build a two-country model linking Poland and the euro area and to
apply it for assessment of heterogeneity across these two regions. Overall, our results can be seen as rather
inconclusive about the di⁄erences in parameters driving behaviour of agents in Poland and the euro area. On
the contrary, we ￿nd strong evidence for heterogeneity in terms of volatility and synchronization of shocks
hitting both economies.
Our results suggest that a policy optimal for the euro area might not be optimal for Poland. This
means that Poland￿ s entry to the EMU will involve costs associated with losing the monetary autonomy and
stabilizing movements of the exchange rate. It is somewhat reassuring, however, that the detected extent of
heterogeneity in terms of imperfect cross country correlation of stochastic disturbances is not very di⁄erent
from that obtained in studies covering relatively closely integrated euro area member states.
It should also be noted that the welfare losses associated with imperfect synchronization of shocks are
usually found to be of small magnitude (see e.g. Corsetti, 2008). Nevertheless, a careful examination of such
costs de￿nitely warrants attention. A ￿ exible design of our model makes it a good workhorse for comparing
alternative monetary regimes, including the ￿xed exchange rate regime. We leave these interesting questions
for future research.
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20Tables and ￿gures
Table 1. Estimation results: structural parameters
Prior distribution Posterior max. Posterior distribution
type mean st. error mode st. error 5% mean 95%
h beta 0.7 0.1 0.800 0.065 0.699 0.797 0.901
h￿ beta 0.7 0.1 0.642 0.091 0.510 0.646 0.780
￿ gamma 1.5 0.4 1.799 0.405 1.266 1.945 2.657
￿￿ gamma 1.5 0.4 1.774 0.373 1.279 1.910 2.571
’ gamma 2.0 0.4 1.936 0.328 1.451 2.014 2.589
’￿ gamma 2.0 0.4 1.820 0.351 1.333 1.915 2.480
S00 normal 4.0 1.5 5.185 1.211 3.542 5.445 7.343
S00￿ normal 4.0 1.5 5.424 1.186 3.756 5.759 7.636
￿H beta 0.5 0.2 0.171 0.131 0.042 0.276 0.513
￿
￿
F beta 0.5 0.2 0.146 0.110 0.037 0.209 0.389
￿N beta 0.5 0.2 0.103 0.075 0.020 0.162 0.295
￿
￿
N beta 0.5 0.2 0.089 0.070 0.017 0.162 0.298
￿W beta 0.5 0.2 0.334 0.167 0.124 0.383 0.634
￿
￿
W beta 0.5 0.2 0.141 0.063 0.051 0.157 0.253
￿H beta 0.7 0.1 0.533 0.079 0.435 0.552 0.678
￿
￿
F beta 0.7 0.1 0.477 0.078 0.367 0.485 0.610
￿N beta 0.7 0.1 0.793 0.043 0.713 0.786 0.863
￿
￿
N beta 0.7 0.1 0.754 0.036 0.694 0.752 0.813
￿W beta 0.7 0.1 0.598 0.055 0.533 0.621 0.707
￿
￿
W beta 0.7 0.1 0.735 0.045 0.683 0.752 0.824
￿ beta 0.7 0.1 0.787 0.026 0.746 0.787 0.830
￿￿ beta 0.7 0.1 0.899 0.016 0.872 0.899 0.925
￿y gamma 0.5 0.1 0.258 0.040 0.202 0.270 0.337
￿
￿
y gamma 0.5 0.1 0.214 0.043 0.153 0.229 0.305
￿￿ gamma 2.0 0.2 2.122 0.170 1.859 2.128 2.400
￿
￿
￿ gamma 2.0 0.2 2.214 0.205 1.864 2.213 2.538
21Table 2. Estimation results: shocks
Prior distribution Posterior max. Posterior distribution
type mean st. error mode st. error 5% mean 95%
￿aH beta 0.7 0.1 0.788 0.063 0.633 0.749 0.867
￿￿
aF beta 0.7 0.1 0.634 0.098 0.460 0.616 0.775
￿aN beta 0.7 0.1 0.939 0.030 0.873 0.923 0.977
￿￿
aN beta 0.7 0.1 0.732 0.094 0.553 0.698 0.848
￿d beta 0.7 0.1 0.679 0.082 0.531 0.664 0.785
￿￿
d beta 0.7 0.1 0.660 0.085 0.519 0.647 0.783
￿l beta 0.7 0.1 0.546 0.096 0.396 0.540 0.694
￿￿
l beta 0.7 0.1 0.621 0.084 0.484 0.621 0.751
￿g beta 0.7 0.1 0.838 0.036 0.774 0.832 0.892
￿￿
g beta 0.7 0.1 0.841 0.055 0.744 0.829 0.918
￿i beta 0.7 0.1 0.754 0.047 0.662 0.739 0.819
￿￿
i beta 0.7 0.1 0.710 0.059 0.602 0.696 0.794
￿aH inv. gamma 9.0 inf 6.339 1.719 4.503 8.132 11.910
￿￿
aF inv. gamma 3.0 inf 1.789 0.477 1.202 2.078 2.937
￿aN inv. gamma 4.5 inf 2.096 0.465 1.555 2.420 3.297
￿￿
aN inv. gamma 1.5 inf 0.767 0.196 0.531 0.905 1.270
￿d inv. gamma 9.0 inf 7.879 2.195 5.025 9.176 13.244
￿￿
d inv. gamma 3.0 inf 2.031 0.513 1.453 2.341 3.278
￿l inv. gamma 18.0 inf 12.705 4.362 7.765 16.623 25.362
￿￿
l inv. gamma 6.0 inf 4.157 1.445 2.563 5.501 8.490
￿g inv. gamma 6.0 inf 5.743 0.609 4.998 6.050 7.104
￿￿
g inv. gamma 2.0 inf 1.169 0.119 1.005 1.217 1.419
￿i inv. gamma 9.0 inf 8.124 1.730 6.035 9.035 11.962
￿￿
i inv. gamma 3.0 inf 2.119 0.463 1.596 2.385 3.168
￿m inv. gamma 0.3 inf 0.265 0.031 0.223 0.276 0.326
￿￿
m inv. gamma 0.1 inf 0.082 0.009 0.068 0.085 0.101
corraH;F normal 0.0 0.4 0.013 0.142 -0.234 -0.006 0.231
corraN normal 0.0 0.4 -0.333 0.127 -0.506 -0.307 -0.095
corrd normal 0.0 0.4 0.329 0.126 0.105 0.309 0.512
corrl normal 0.0 0.4 0.285 0.138 0.051 0.269 0.492
corrg normal 0.0 0.4 0.128 0.136 -0.089 0.122 0.348
corri normal 0.0 0.4 0.356 0.126 0.136 0.341 0.547
corrm normal 0.0 0.4 -0.049 0.147 -0.270 -0.045 0.183
22Table 3. Variance decomposition - output
Shocks 1Q 4Q 8Q 100Q
Productivity shock in tradables - Poland 26.1 30.8 21.5 11.5
Productivity shock in tradables - euro area 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1
Productivity shock in nontradables - Poland 14.2 27.9 40.7 53.9
Productivity shock in nontradables - euro area 2.0 3.2 4.3 5.7
Consumption preference shock - Poland 3.5 4.4 2.8 1.7
Consumption preference shock - euro area 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.3
Labour supply shock - Poland 1.4 2.7 2.8 1.7
Labour supply shock - euro area 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Government spending shock - Poland 39.2 11.1 6.0 3.3
Government spending shock - euro area 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1
Investment e¢ ciency shock - Poland 6.7 14.6 17.5 18.7
Investment e¢ ciency shock - euro area 1.5 2.6 2.7 2.5
Monetary policy shock - Poland 2.8 1.1 0.7 0.4
Monetary policy shock - euro area 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0
Table 4. Variance decomposition - consumption
Shocks 1Q 4Q 8Q 100Q
Productivity shock in tradables - Poland 0.8 2.2 2.6 1.5
Productivity shock in tradables - euro area 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Productivity shock in nontradables - Poland 1.8 6.4 14.2 33.5
Productivity shock in nontradables - euro area 0.1 0.6 1.4 3.4
Consumption preference shock - Poland 87.1 80.2 71.1 39.4
Consumption preference shock - euro area 8.4 7.4 6.4 3.6
Labour supply shock - Poland 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.6
Labour supply shock - euro area 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Government spending shock - Poland 0.6 1.2 1.9 1.8
Government spending shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
Investment e¢ ciency shock - Poland 0.3 0.7 0.7 13.1
Investment e¢ ciency shock - euro area 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.6
Monetary policy shock - Poland 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2
Monetary policy shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
23Table 5. Variance decomposition - investment
Shocks 1Q 4Q 8Q 100Q
Productivity shock in tradables - Poland 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3
Productivity shock in tradables - euro area 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Productivity shock in nontradables - Poland 6.6 14.0 23.4 36.0
Productivity shock in nontradables - euro area 0.7 1.5 2.6 4.0
Consumption preference shock - Poland 1.1 1.9 2.8 3.1
Consumption preference shock - euro area 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Labour supply shock - Poland 0.4 0.8 0.9 0.8
Labour supply shock - euro area 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Government spending shock - Poland 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.8
Government spending shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment e¢ ciency shock - Poland 79.6 70.9 60.5 48.1
Investment e¢ ciency shock - euro area 9.3 8.0 6.7 5.3
Monetary policy shock - Poland 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
Monetary policy shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 6. Variance decomposition - real wage rate
Shocks 1Q 4Q 8Q 100Q
Productivity shock in tradables - Poland 23.3 17.7 10.8 3.5
Productivity shock in tradables - euro area 2.1 0.9 0.5 0.1
Productivity shock in nontradables - Poland 5.5 23.9 45.1 59.2
Productivity shock in nontradables - euro area 0.2 2.1 4.6 6.1
Consumption preference shock - Poland 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.6
Consumption preference shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Labour supply shock - Poland 57.7 44.6 25.0 7.9
Labour supply shock - euro area 3.8 2.8 1.5 0.5
Government spending shock - Poland 1.9 0.6 0.3 0.4
Government spending shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment e¢ ciency shock - Poland 3.3 5.9 10.3 18.1
Investment e¢ ciency shock - euro area 0.2 0.6 1.3 3.2
Monetary policy shock - Poland 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1
Monetary policy shock - euro area 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
24Table 7. Variance decomposition - real exchange rate
Shocks 1Q 4Q 8Q 100Q
Productivity shock in tradables - Poland 15.5 13.8 9.6 4.4
Productivity shock in tradables - euro area 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Productivity shock in nontradables - Poland 35.2 46.8 54.5 53.8
Productivity shock in nontradables - euro area 7.5 10.1 10.6 8.5
Consumption preference shock - Poland 10.2 9.3 9.4 5.5
Consumption preference shock - euro area 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Labour supply shock - Poland 2.2 3.0 2.7 1.4
Labour supply shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Government spending shock - Poland 10.8 8.0 6.9 3.8
Government spending shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment e¢ ciency shock - Poland 6.2 4.4 3.2 20.6
Investment e¢ ciency shock - euro area 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.7
Monetary policy shock - Poland 8.9 2.8 1.8 0.8
Monetary policy shock - euro area 3.0 1.2 0.8 0.4
Table 8. Variance decomposition - in￿ ation
Shocks 1Q 4Q 8Q 100Q
Productivity shock in tradables - Poland 63.7 43.6 36.2 25.7
Productivity shock in tradables - euro area 2.1 1.1 0.9 0.7
Productivity shock in nontradables - Poland 23.5 42.9 49.1 53.4
Productivity shock in nontradables - euro area 1.6 4.1 5.0 5.5
Consumption preference shock - Poland 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Consumption preference shock - euro area 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Labour supply shock - Poland 3.2 4.7 4.2 3.0
Labour supply shock - euro area 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3
Government spending shock - Poland 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Government spending shock - euro area 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment e¢ ciency shock - Poland 0.6 0.4 1.6 8.3
Investment e¢ ciency shock - euro area 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0
Monetary policy shock - Poland 3.8 1.8 1.5 1.1
Monetary policy shock - euro area 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
25Table 9. Variance decomposition - interest rate
Shocks 1Q 4Q 8Q 100Q
Productivity shock in tradables - Poland 49.2 37.5 25.4 16.0
Productivity shock in tradables - euro area 2.5 1.4 0.9 0.6
Productivity shock in nontradables - Poland 17.1 40.9 52.9 58.3
Productivity shock in nontradables - euro area 1.0 3.5 5.2 6.1
Consumption preference shock - Poland 0.1 1.1 2.2 2.1
Consumption preference shock - euro area 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5
Labour supply shock - Poland 2.5 4.8 4.5 2.9
Labour supply shock - euro area 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.4
Government spending shock - Poland 0.7 2.3 2.5 1.9
Government spending shock - euro area 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Investment e¢ ciency shock - Poland 0.1 0.6 0.9 7.7
Investment e¢ ciency shock - euro area 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.4
Monetary policy shock - Poland 25.9 6.0 3.6 2.3
Monetary policy shock - euro area 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0
26Table 10. Testing sources of heterogeneity
No. Hypothesis Log marginal data density Bayes factor
0 unrestricted model -439.7 1.000
1 h = h￿ -440.6 0.426
2 ￿ = ￿￿ -438.9 2.315
3 ’ = ’￿ -439.7 1.039
4 S00 = S00￿ -438.8 2.489
5 ￿H = ￿
￿
F -438.3 4.033
6 ￿N = ￿
￿
N -437.2 12.944
7 ￿W = ￿
￿
W -439.2 1.673
8 ￿H = ￿
￿
F -437.7 7.568
9 ￿N = ￿
￿
N -439.1 1.756
10 ￿W = ￿
￿
W -440.8 0.354
11 ￿ = ￿￿ -444.6 0.008
12 ￿y = ￿
￿
y -441.4 0.188
13 ￿￿ = ￿
￿
￿ -439.2 1.633
14 ￿aH = ￿￿
aF -440.3 0.532
15 ￿aN = ￿￿
aN -439.9 0.857
16 ￿d = ￿￿
d -439.5 1.278
17 ￿l = ￿￿
l -438.8 2.385
18 ￿g = ￿￿
g -438.4 3.872
19 ￿i = ￿￿
i -439.4 1.323
20 ￿aH = ￿￿
aF -444.5 0.008
21 ￿aN = ￿￿
aN -442.2 0.085
22 ￿d = ￿￿
d -445.3 0.004
23 ￿l = ￿￿
l -441.2 0.227
24 ￿g = ￿￿
g -486.4 0.000
25 ￿i = ￿￿
i -449.4 0.000
26 ￿m = ￿￿
m -461.0 0.000
27 corraH;F ￿ 1 -493.1 0.000
28 corraN ￿ 1 -510.1 0.000
29 corrd ￿ 1 -483.8 0.000
30 corrl ￿ 1 -476.2 0.000
31 corrg ￿ 1 -487.8 0.000
32 corri ￿ 1 -473.1 0.000
33 corrm ￿ 1 -492.7 0.000
34 utility (1-3) -439.7 1.007
35 price and wage formation (5-10) -434.6 174.469
36 structural (1-10) -433.8 380.615
37 policy reaction (11-13) -438.9 2.320
38 shock inertia (14-19) -437.6 8.536
39 shock volatility (20-26) -527.3 0.000
40 shock inertia and volatility (37-38) -543.6 0.000
41 (nearly) perfect correlation of shocks (27-33) -9.2E+18 0.000
42 stochastic homogeneity (39-41) -38034.8 0.000
43 no correlation of shocks -443.0 0.036
27Figure 1. Prior and posterior densities - parameters
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28Figure 2. Prior and posterior densities - shocks
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29Figure 3. Impulse response: tradable goods productivity shock in Poland
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Figure 4. Impulse response: tradable goods productivity shock in the euro area
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30Figure 5. Impulse response: nontradable goods productivity shock in Poland
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Figure 6. Impulse response: nontradable goods productivity shock in the euro area
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Note: solid line - Poland, dashed line - euro area.
31Figure 7. Impulse response: consumption preference shock in Poland
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Figure 8. Impulse response: consumption preference shock in the euro area
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32Figure 9. Impulse response: labour supply shock in Poland
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Figure 10. Impulse response: labour supply shock in the euro area
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33Figure 11. Impulse response: government spending shock in Poland
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Figure 12. Impulse response: government spending shock in the euro area
10 20 30 40
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Output
10 20 30 40
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
Consumption
10 20 30 40
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
Investment
10 20 30 40
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
Capital
10 20 30 40
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Labour input
10 20 30 40
-0.02
-0.01
0
Real wage rate
10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Terms of trade
10 20 30 40
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Real exchange rate
10 20 30 40
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Interest rate
10 20 30 40
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
Inflation in tradables
10 20 30 40
-5
0
5
10
15
x 10
-3 Inflation in nontradables
10 20 30 40
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Inflation
Note: solid line - Poland, dashed line - euro area.
34Figure 13. Impulse response: investment e¢ ciency shock in Poland
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Figure 14. Impulse response: investment e¢ ciency shock in the euro area
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35Figure 15. Impulse response: monetary policy shock in Poland
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Figure 16. Impulse response: monetary policy shock in the euro area
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36Figure 17. Stochastic disturbances
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37Figure 18. Data and one-step-ahead forecasts
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Note: solid line - Poland, dashed line - euro area.
38Appendix. Log-linearized model equations
This appendix lists all log-linearized equations of the model. Variables in small letters denote their log
deviations from the deterministic steady state.
Market clearing conditions25
yH;t =
￿ C
￿ YH
￿c￿
1 + !
(ct + (1 ￿ ￿c)xt + (1 ￿ ￿)st) +
￿ C￿
￿ YH
1 ￿ n
n
￿￿
c￿￿
1 + !￿ (c￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)x￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿￿)st) + (63)
+
￿ I
￿ YH
￿i￿(it + (1 ￿ ￿i)(1 + !)xt + (1 ￿ ￿)st) +
￿ I￿
￿ YH
1 ￿ n
n
￿￿
i￿￿ (i￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿￿
i)(1 + !￿)x￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿￿)st)
y￿
F;t =
￿ C￿
￿ Y ￿
F
￿￿
c(1 ￿ ￿￿)
1 + !￿ (c￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)x￿
t + ￿￿st) +
￿ C
￿ Y ￿
F
1 ￿ n
n
￿c(1 ￿ ￿)
1 + !
(ct + (1 ￿ ￿c)xt ￿ ￿st) + (64)
+
￿ I￿
￿ Y ￿
F
￿￿
i(1 ￿ ￿￿)(i￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿￿
i)(1 + !￿)x￿
t + ￿￿st) +
￿ I
￿ Y ￿
F
1 ￿ n
n
￿i(1 ￿ ￿)(it + (1 ￿ ￿i)(1 + !)xt ￿ ￿st)
yN;t =
￿ C
￿ YN
￿
(1 ￿ ￿c)(ct ￿ ￿cxt) +
￿c!
1 + !
(ct + (1 ￿ ￿c)xt)
￿
+ (65)
+
￿ I
￿ YN
(1 ￿ ￿i)(it ￿ ￿ixt) +
￿ G
￿ YN
"g;t
y￿
N;t =
￿ C￿
￿ Y ￿
N
￿
(1 ￿ ￿￿
c)(c￿
t ￿ ￿￿
cx￿
t) +
￿￿
c!￿
1 + !￿(c￿
t + (1 ￿ ￿￿
c)x￿
t)
￿
+ (66)
+
￿ I￿
￿ Y ￿
N
(1 ￿ ￿￿
i)(i￿
t ￿ ￿￿
ix￿
t) +
￿ G￿
￿ Y ￿
N
"￿
g;t
yt =
￿ YH
￿ Y
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￿ YN
￿ Y
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y￿
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￿ Y ￿
F
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￿ Y ￿
N
￿ Y ￿ y￿
N;t (68)
Consumption (Euler) equations
ct ￿ hct￿1 = Et(ct+1 ￿ hct) ￿
1 ￿ h
￿
(rt ￿ Et￿t+1) +
1
￿
("d;t ￿ "d;t+1) (69)
c￿
t ￿ h￿c￿
t￿1 = Et(c￿
t+1 ￿ h￿c￿
t) ￿
1 ￿ h￿
￿￿
￿
rt ￿ Et￿￿
t+1
￿
+
1
￿￿("￿
d;t ￿ "￿
d;t+1) (70)
International risk sharing condition
qt = "￿
d;t ￿ "d;t ￿
￿￿
1 ￿ h￿(c￿
t ￿ h￿c￿
t￿1) +
￿
1 ￿ h
(ct ￿ hct￿1) (71)
Capital accumulation
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + ￿(it + "i;t) (72)
25Steady-state ratios are expressed in nominal terms. For
￿ C￿
￿ YH
,
￿ I￿
￿ YH
,
￿ C
￿ Y ￿
F
and
￿ I
￿ Y ￿
F
we use normalization ￿ Y = ￿ Y ￿.
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t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿￿)k￿
t + ￿￿(i￿
t + "￿
i;t) (73)
Real cost of capital
rk
t = wt + lt + kt (74)
rk￿
t = w￿
t + l￿
t + k￿
t (75)
Investment demand
it ￿ it￿1 = ￿(it+1 ￿ it) +
1
S00(qT;t + "i;t) ￿
￿i(1 + !) + ￿c
S00 xt (76)
i￿
t ￿ i￿
t￿1 = ￿
￿(i￿
t+1 ￿ i￿
t) +
1
S00￿ (q￿
T;t + "￿
i;t) ￿
￿￿
i(1 + !￿) + ￿￿
c
S00￿ x￿
t (77)
Price of installed capital
qT;t = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)qT;t+1 ￿ (rt ￿ Et￿t+1) + (1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿))rk
t+1 (78)
q￿
T;t = ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)q￿
T;t+1 ￿ (r￿
t ￿ Et￿￿
t+1) + (1 ￿ ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿￿))rk￿
t+1 (79)
Labour input
lt = ￿(zt ￿ wt) +
￿ YH
￿ Y
(yH;t ￿ "aH;t) +
￿ YN
￿ Y
(yN;t ￿ "aN;t) (80)
l￿
t = ￿￿(z￿
t ￿ w￿
t) +
￿ Y ￿
F
￿ Y ￿(y￿
F;t ￿ "￿
aF;t) +
￿ Y ￿
N
￿ Y ￿ (y￿
N;t ￿ "￿
aN;t) (81)
Real wage rate
￿wt =
(1 ￿ ￿W)(1 ￿ ￿￿W)
￿W(1 + ￿’)
(mrst ￿ wt) + ￿Et￿wt+1 + ￿Et(￿t+1 ￿ ￿W￿t) ￿ (￿t ￿ ￿W￿t￿1) (82)
￿w￿
t =
(1 ￿ ￿
￿
W)(1 ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
W)
￿
￿
W(1 + ￿
￿’￿)
(mrs￿
t ￿ w￿
t) + ￿
￿Et￿w￿
t+1 + ￿
￿Et(￿￿
t+1 ￿ ￿
￿
W￿￿
t) ￿ (￿￿
t ￿ ￿
￿
W￿￿
t￿1) (83)
Marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour
mrst = "l;t + ’lt ￿ "d;t +
￿
1 ￿ h
(ct ￿ hct￿1) (84)
mrs￿
t = "￿
l;t + ’￿l￿
t ￿ "￿
d;t +
￿￿
1 ￿ h￿(c￿
t ￿ h￿c￿
t￿1) (85)
Home tradable goods Phillips curves
￿H;t ￿ ￿H￿H;t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿H)(1 ￿ ￿￿H)
￿H
mcH;t + ￿Et(￿H;t+1 ￿ ￿H￿H;t) (86)
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F;t ￿ ￿
￿
F￿￿
F;t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿
￿
F)(1 ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
F)
￿
￿
F
mc￿
F;t + ￿
￿Et(￿￿
F;t+1 ￿ ￿
￿
F￿￿
F;t) (87)
Nontradable goods Phillips curves
￿N;t ￿ ￿N￿N;t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿N)(1 ￿ ￿￿N)
￿N
mcN;t + ￿Et(￿N;t+1 ￿ ￿N￿N;t) (88)
￿￿
N;t ￿ ￿
￿
N￿￿
N;t￿1 =
(1 ￿ ￿
￿
N)(1 ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿
N)
￿
￿
N
mc￿
N;t + ￿
￿Et(￿￿
N;t+1 ￿ ￿
￿
N￿￿
N;t) (89)
Real marginal cost for tradable goods
mcH;t = (1 ￿ ￿)wt + ￿rk
t ￿ "aH;t + (1 ￿ ￿)st + (1 + ! ￿ ￿)xt (90)
mc￿
F;t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)w￿
t + ￿￿rk￿
t ￿ "￿
aF;t ￿ ￿￿st + (1 + !￿ ￿ ￿￿)x￿
t (91)
Real marginal cost for nontradable goods
mcN;t = (1 ￿ ￿)wt + ￿rk
t ￿ "aN;t ￿ ￿xt (92)
mc￿
N;t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)w￿
t + ￿￿rk￿
t ￿ "￿
aN;t ￿ ￿￿x￿
t (93)
Relative price of nontradable consumption goods
￿xt = ￿N;t ￿ ￿T;t (94)
￿x￿
t = ￿￿
N;t ￿ ￿￿
T;t (95)
In￿ ation of tradable consumption goods
￿T;t =
1
1 + !
(￿H;t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿st + !￿N;t) (96)
￿￿
T;t =
1
1 + !￿(￿￿
F;t ￿ ￿￿￿st + !￿￿￿
N;t) (97)
CPI in￿ ation
￿t = ￿￿T;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿N;t (98)
￿￿
t = ￿￿￿￿
T;t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿￿
N;t (99)
Real exchange rate
qt = (￿ ￿ ￿￿)st + (1 + !￿ ￿ ￿￿)x￿
t ￿ (1 + ! ￿ ￿)xt (100)
Monetary policy rules
rt = ￿rt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿yyt + ￿￿￿t) + "m;t (101)
41r￿
t = ￿￿r￿
t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿
￿
yy￿
t + ￿
￿
￿￿￿
t) + "￿
m;t (102)
Productivity shocks in tradable sectors
"aH;t = ￿aH"aH;t￿1 + ￿aH;t (103)
"￿
aF;t = ￿￿
aF"￿
aF;t￿1 + ￿￿
aF;t (104)
Productivity shocks in nontradable sectors
"aN;t = ￿aN"aN;t￿1 + ￿aN;t (105)
"￿
aN;t = ￿￿
aN"￿
aN;t￿1 + ￿￿
aN;t (106)
Consumption preference shocks
"d;t = ￿d"d;t￿1 + ￿d;t (107)
"￿
d;t = ￿￿
d"￿
d;t￿1 + ￿￿
d;t (108)
Labour supply shocks
"l;t = ￿l"l;t￿1 + ￿l;t (109)
"￿
l;t = ￿￿
l "￿
l;t￿1 + ￿￿
l;t (110)
Government spending shocks
"g;t = ￿g"g;t￿1 + ￿g;t (111)
"￿
g;t = ￿￿
g"￿
g;t￿1 + ￿￿
g;t (112)
Investment e¢ ciency shocks
"i;t = ￿i"i;t￿1 + ￿i;t (113)
"￿
i;t = ￿￿
i"￿
i;t￿1 + ￿￿
i;t (114)
Monetary shocks
"m;t (115)
"￿
m;t (116)
Vectors of stochastic disturbances:
ut = [ui;t] = [￿aH;t ￿aN;t ￿d;t ￿l;t ￿g;t ￿i;t "m;t] (117)
42u￿
t = [u￿
i;t] = [￿￿
aF;t ￿￿
aN;t ￿￿
d;t ￿￿
l;t ￿￿
g;t ￿￿
i;t "￿
m;t] (118)
with:
E[ui;t] = E[u￿
i;t] = 0 (119)
E[ui;tui;t] = ￿2
i E[u￿
i;tu￿
i;t] = ￿￿2
i (120)
E[ui;tu￿
i;t] = corri￿i￿￿
i (121)
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